The GBGA was created to give local and overseas governments, regulators and policy makers more of an understanding of Gibraltar online gaming and the vital role it plays for the industry. The objectives of the European Gaming and Betting Association are to promote fair competition for licenced EU operators and consumer choice in regulated gaming and betting market. The GBGA itself provides the online gaming industry with a single voice on all issues relating to online gambling including legislation and regulation of the industry.
The members of the GBGA are committed to ensuring responsible gaming and the highest industry standards. They are there to ensure consumers are fully informed and protected whilst playing casino games and betting online. The Gibraltar Betting and Gaming Association has a vision that consist of 6 key points.
The first of which is safe, fair and competitive offering. This means that association is there to ensure that players receive competitive offerings with safe, fair gaming in a regulated gaming environment. The second key point is High Standards for Consumers. Here the association aims to get operators to work together with governments to provide high standards of gaming across Europe.
The third point is to establish Gibraltar as Centre of Excellence. The Gibraltar Betting and Gaming Association actively promotes Gibraltar as a centre for gaming excellence. The fourth key point of vison for the GBGA is to establish Gibraltar a world leaders in online gaming. The fifth Key point is online gaming best practices.
However, the AG's Opinion [with which the decision agreed] did run into some speculative thinking if the 'single state' analysis was in error. However, Dane feels that this will not necessarily make Gibraltar an unattractive destination for such companies. Therefore, an operator would need to look at the wider direct and indirect tax regimes applicable in its jurisdiction of establishment to determine whether its location is tax-efficient.
Following this, he does not expect to see GBGA members to leave Gibraltar as a result of the decision. It is also the case that relocating a substantial business operation to another territory purely for tax reasons is potentially commercially costly and the overall economic balance must be considered.
All material subject to strictly enforced copyright laws. For help please see our FAQ. This content is from: Austria.
This website is among the most generous Gibraltar slots sites. Moreover, they get to try games by alternative providers such as Booming, SA Gaming, and Playson besides picks by Betsoft and Microgaming. This online slot site looks great and pampers its players, UK or otherwise.
This Gibraltar casino online website also has a vast game collection, with picks powered by Betsoft, Merkur, Booongo, and many other brands featured in the guide where casino with no ID required. Fortune Clock is generous too and gives tons of free cash and bonus spins to players.
Have you ever wondered what makes Gibraltar online casinos so popular among British gamblers? Well, their strict licencing requirements, refreshing game menus, following trends , and mobile readiness are some of the main reasons. Below, we will summarise their main features so our readers can get a better picture of what to expect.
Many big brands have established themselves in this little island. Lots of British players prefer to play in Gibraltar casinos due to its benefits. All players should get to know what these Gibraltar slot sites for sports betting have to offer. Not everything that shines is gold, and that phrase applies to online casinos as well. There are some drawbacks which you must be aware of before starting to play.
When you play in an online casino in Gibraltar you are taking some risks. These are independent casinos. Players are often looking for more exciting and original casino games. The UK is one of the places that gather the most gamblers. Independent online casino games have available unique games which not many people are aware of. Many British people are now consumers of Gibraltar casinos.
Most of them are licensed by the GBGA. Gibraltar is a self-governing British Crown Dependency, yet it retains independence in various sectors such as taxation and iGaming regulations. Gibraltar casinos online must hold the GBGA licence to operate legally. The activity itself, therefore, is legal as long as casinos obtain the appropriate licencing. The official authority in the country is the Gambling Division of the Government , which was merged with the Gibraltar Regulatory Authority.
The list of Gibraltar online gambling games is enormous as the jurisdiction works with all popular game providers. In terms of popularity, online slots remain a top pick among gamblers at Gibraltar casinos. Table and card games are popular too, while live dealer platforms are quickly moving towards the top. According to the Government of Gibraltar, all gambling operations require licensing. Therefore, yes, they are all licensed by the CBGA. Otherwise, they would be working illegally.
There are other clauses which ensure the protection of the user. Therefore, you can rely on Gibraltar casino websites for online gambling. There are more benefits than disadvantages when it comes to gambling on these websites. Many casinos offer great user experience. This includes sign-up bonuses, and daily, weekly or monthly prizes. Some of them are Crazyno and Fortune Clock. They have a good reputation around the web. They make sure their customers are satisfied by constantly listening to their inquiries.
Many British players are pleased with all the benefits they get from playing at an online Gibraltar casino. William Terry is the author and one of NonStopCasino creators. Being the Doctor of Laws, he knows all aspects of the jurisprudence system in the United Kingdom. Since , when the Gambling Act had been released, Will has graduated from the University of Oxford and dived into the UK online gambling industry. We're proud to feature his articles on our site and deliver his professional tips to our readers.
If you have any questions or want to get advice, please, contact William via e-mail. Dear readers! After graduating from LSE, I started writing articles about the online gambling industry and problem gambling as one part of it. After years of working, I've got an invitation from NonStopCasino. Watch out for the croc! All Slots Casino. All Slots Casino Review.
T's and C's apply. Full terms. Aussie themed! Built For You Dunder. Join Dunder Dunder Review. Over 20 years old! Visit Guts Guts Casino Review. Neteller, Skrill Paysafecard excluded. Chuck a shrimp on the barbie! Join Gday Gday Casino Review. Emu Casino. Emu Casino Review. Rizk Casino. Rizk Casino Review.
Loads of daily promotions! Visit 32Red 32Red Casino Review. High Stakes Casino! UK only.
Section 67 concerns "Remote gambling". It provides in full, as follows: "Remote gambling 1 An operating licence is a "remote operating licence" if it authorises activity to be carried on a in respect of remote gambling, or b by means of remote communication. A person seeking a licence must apply to the GC. The application must: specify the activities to be authorised by the licence; specify an address in the United Kingdom at which a document issued under the Act may be served upon the applicant; be made in such form and manner as the GC directs; state whether the applicant has been convicted of a relevant offence; state whether the applicant has been convicted of any other offence; contain or be accompanied by such other information or documents as the GC may direct; and, be accompanied by the prescribed fee.
The general principles and criteria which are to be applied by the GC in determining whether to grant a licence are set out in section These include not surprisingly having regard to the licensing objectives. They also require the GC to form and have regard to an opinion of the applicant's suitability to carry on the licensed activities, and to consider the suitability of any gaming machine or other equipment to be used in connection with the licensed activities.
Section 70 2 empowers "may" the GC to have regard to: " a the integrity of the applicant or of a person relevant to the application; b the competence of the applicant or of a person relevant to the application to carry on the licensed activities in a manner consistent with pursuit of the licensing objectives; c the financial and other circumstances of the applicant or of a person relevant to the application and, in particular, the resources likely to be available for the purpose of carrying on the licensed activities ".
Section 70 4 stipulates that the statement required to be produced pursuant to section 23 see above must specify the principles applied by the GC in considering applications under section Further it must, and in particular, specify the kind of evidence to which the GC will have regard when assessing integrity, competence and financial or other circumstances.
The section provides that the evidence might include interviews conducted by or on behalf of the GC, references provided to the GC at the request of the applicant, information or opinions provided to the GC by other persons, information sought by the GC as to the solvency in general and financial reserves in particular of the applicant, the completion of training and the possession of qualifications. In determining whether to grant a licence the GC is not permitted to have regard to the area within Great Britain within which it is proposed to provide facilities or the expected demand for facilities which it is proposed to provide.
Section 75 et seq concerns the conditions which may be imposed within licences. In particular, section 75 confers upon the GC a power to specify conditions. The provision, in full, is in the following terms: " General conditions imposed by Commission 1 The Commission may specify conditions to be attached to a each operating licence, or b each operating licence falling within a specified class. It follows from the above that the GC is empowered but not obliged to specify conditions.
Conditions may be attached to operating licences or operating licences falling within a specified class. Where the GC grants an operating licence it is obliged to impose those conditions which it considers are relevant to a class where the operating licensee falls within that specified class. Pursuant to section 76 the GC is empowered to amend or invoke conditions specified under section Section 76 1 is in the following terms: " 1 The Commission may amend or revoke a condition specified under section 75; and a reference in this section to the specification of a condition includes a reference to the amendment or revocation of a condition".
An issue arose in the course of submissions as to the scope and effect of this power of amendment or revocation and whether that power applied to class licences under section 75 1 b. The issue arose in the context of the Claimant's submission that there was no flexibility on the part of the GC to create bespoke or tailor-made class conditions and that this was a flaw in the legislative regime in that it prevented the GC from taking account of the nature and extent of regulation already imposed upon operators by foreign regulators.
It was submitted that this increased the scope for the unnecessary duplication of regulatory conditions, obligations and burdens on operators. Ultimately this was advanced in order to support the Claimant's primary contention that the scheme of the legislation was disproportionate. My provisional view as to the scope of section 76 1 was that it empowered the GC to amend conditions contained in either individual operating licences or class licences and that the GC was not, thereby, fettered in its ability to modify licences to take account of the situation individual licensees found themselves in.
However, counsel for both the Secretary of State and the GC submitted that upon a teleological or purposive interpretation of sections 75 and 76 combined the GC was constrained in that it had no ability to vary the conditions contained in a class licence. For the purpose of this judicial review I propose to accept the construction placed upon section 76 by Miss Dinah Rose QC for the Claimant, which as I have observed was shared by the Defendants, and work upon the basis that the GC has no power to vary the minimum set of conditions to be imposed in association with a licence and that this, at least to some degree, does fetter the ability of the GC to mould licence conditions to suit the particular position of individual licensees.
I should, however, make clear that I am not deciding, as a matter of law, that this is the correct construction of section 76, which is a matter which may be left for another day. I am proceeding upon this basis since it is favourable to the Claimant and is the view of the legislation presently held by the Secretary of State and by the GC. Finally, in relation to the imposition of conditions, pursuant to section 77 the GC, when issuing an operating licence, is empowered to attach conditions thereto.
The scope and nature of the power to attach conditions is elaborated upon in sections 79 and 80 GA There is nothing particularly surprising about the content of these provisions which reflect the powers conferred upon regulators in other economic sectors. It empowers the GC and the Secretary of State to impose conditions restricting the activities that may be carried on in reliance upon the licence by reference to the nature of the activities, the circumstances in which they are carried on or their extent.
Conditions may also be imposed which address the facilities that may or must be provided in connection with the licensed activity, the manner in which the facilities are provided, the number of persons that may or must be employed in the provision of facilities, the financial resources which must be made available for particular purposes to the person providing the facilities. There is, moreover, in section 79 4 e a power to impose a condition about "any other matter".
Section 79 5 permits the imposition of conditions relating to the financial circumstances of the licensee or of any other person involved or likely to be involved in the conduct of the licensed activities, in particular in relation to the making of provision for the maintenance of reserves in respect of potential liabilities. Section 79 6 concerns remote operating licences. It is in the following terms: " 6 A condition of a remote operating licence may restrict the methods of communication that may be used in the course of the licensed activities".
Further conditions may be imposed relating to the manner in which the facilities for gambling are advertised or described. Section 76 8 permits the imposition of conditions concerning the provision of assistance to persons who are or may be affected by problems relating to gambling. Section 79 9 permits the imposition of conditions which make provision for the establishment of the identity of users of facilities, for the recording of the identity of such users, or for restricting the provision of facilities to persons who are registered in respect of facilities in advance.
Section 80 GA concerns "Requirement for personal licence". This imposes an obligation upon the GC to use its powers under sections 75 and 77 to ensure that in respect of each operating licence at least one person occupies a specified management office in or in respect of the licensee or in connection with the licensed activities, and holds a personal licence authorising the performance of the functions of the office. The purpose of section 80 is to require operators to identify individuals performing senior management roles in relation to the gambling activity who, pursuant to licence, will be made responsible for the proper performance of the licensing operator's licence obligations.
A final matter that I need to address in relation to the statutory framework concerns the provisions relating to advertising in Part 16 GA Pursuant to section a person commits a criminal offence if he advertises unlawful gambling.
The net effect of the section is that gambling is unlawful if it is unlicensed. Section defines "advertising" in broad terms: " 1 For the purposes of this Act a person advertises gambling if a he does anything to encourage one or more persons to take advantage whether directly or through an agent of facilities for gambling, b with a view to increasing the use of facilities for gambling, he brings them or information about them to the attention of one or more persons, or c he participates in or facilitates an activity knowing or believing that it is designed to i encourage one or more persons to take advantage whether directly or through an agent of facilities for gambling, or ii increase the use of facilities for gambling by bringing them or information about them to the attention of one or more persons".
It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1 GA to show that he reasonably believed that the advertised gambling was lawful: cf section 4. Further, section 5 imposes a burden upon the prosecution to establish that a person indicted knew or should have known that the advertised gambling was unlawful: cf section 5. It concerns the territorial application of rules relating to remote advertising. So far as relevant the provision is in the following form.
The amended provisions are italicised in the text below, the repealed provisions are underlined: "Territorial application: remote advertising 2 The prohibition in section 1 applies to advertising by way of remote communication only if a the advertising satisfies the test in subsection 4 ,. The net effect of the amendments is that whereas it was previously a criminal offence to advertise the unlawful services of operators who had at least one piece of remote gambling equipment located in Great Britain or who were not in an EEA including Gibraltar or White List jurisdiction, it is, pursuant to these amendments, now a criminal offence to advertise the unlawful services of operators based anywhere in the world even though no gambling equipment is located in Great Britain.
It is a criminal offence provided the operator's facilities are capable of being used in Great Britain. It follows that an operator, wherever they are located in the world, whose services are capable of being used by customers in Great Britain and who is not licensed by the GC will attract criminal liability if it advertises its services in this jurisdiction.
This will apply even if the operator has no intention of targeting British customers but is not able effectively to block such customers accessing its services. I turn now to the administrative measures adopted under section 23 GA which are in place to implement the statutory regime. In September the GC issued a statement of principles for licensing and regulation. It is relevant to identify some of the salient features of this statement since, notwithstanding the amendments to the GA , they will, largely, retain their currency under the new regime.
Paragraph 2. It is apparent that the GC expects and evidence before the Court indicates that the expectation is justified co-operation from licensees. All regulatory regimes, of whatever hue, operate to a greater or lesser degree upon the basis that the regulated community undertakes a degree of self-assessment and maintains co-operative relations with the regulator. This is a point to which I will return later in the context of the Claimant's submissions that the enforcement regime under the GA as amended is inadequate.
In section 3 of the statement entitled "Applicable principles" the GC sets out in broad terms its position in relation to a number of matters. In particular, in paragraph 3. This has resonance in the context of the Claimant's submissions that the present regime is inadequate. That criticism must be viewed in light of the position of the Secretary of State and the GC that the new regime may need to be adapted over time. An important statement affecting how the GC will exercise its powers is paragraph 3.
The Claimant relies upon paragraph 3. The Claimant submits that the new regime is however rife with duplicative obligations and burdens which supports its contention that the overall regime is disproportionate. Finally, paragraph 3. Support for the principle of mutual co-operation between regulators is found further in paragraph 4. In September the GC also issued a licensing compliance and enforcement statement which set out the GC's policies in relation to the assessment of risk, the licensing of operators and key personnel, the carrying out of compliance activities, and, enforcement.
The gravamen of the statement was that the level and nature of the GC's interventions would depend upon its assessment of the likelihood of risk presented by the activity or operator in question and the taking of proportionate action. Risk was measured by reference to the impact upon the statutory licensing objectives: "3.
However, the Commission takes a risk based and proportionate approach to the amount and detail of information an applicant is required to provide. Guidance on the type of information required is included in the guidance notes that accompany the application form". The statement goes on to set out a series of criteria the GC would apply in determining applications for licences.
Once a licence is granted the GC seeks to ensure through its compliance work that the licensee remains suitable to hold a licence and that it conducts itself in a manner consistent with the licensing objectives, the requirements of the Act and the conditions set out in the licence and related codes of practice: cf Statement paragraph 4. The GC states cf paragraph 4. In relation to the overall conduct of the GC at paragraph 4.
In relation to requests for information the GC states cf paragraph 4. Wherever possible, licensees will be given a reasonable period of time to comply with the request. The Commission will seek to take into account the burden placed on the individual or business when removing records so that it causes minimal disruption". In paragraph 4. This will ensure that the Commission's resources are focussed primarily on those operators, individuals and activities which present the greatest risks to the licensing objectives".
In May the GC issued a consolidated and up to date version of the applicable licence conditions and codes of practice hereafter "LCCP". For the reasons that I have set out above at paragraph  I treat the LCCP as irreducible minimum conditions applicable to all operators which are not susceptible to modification to take account of the individual circumstances of particular licensees. As I have already explained this is significant by virtue of the Claimant's submission that the GC is denied, under the present regime, the ability to modify licences to take account of objectively justified, and legitimate, differences between particular licensees.
It is also relevant, at this juncture, to record that the position of the Secretary of State and of the GC is that whilst it is appropriate to maintain a uniform set of minimum conditions there is nonetheless considerable flexibility conferred upon the GC as to the manner in which those conditions are applied and enforced.
And it is in this latter context that the GC enjoys considerable latitude and discretion to take account of the different circumstances that individual licensees find themselves in, including taking account of the fact that a particular licensee might already be subject to effective regulation in an off-shore jurisdiction.
Because it is no part of the Claimant's case that any particular operating licence condition is disproportionate in and of itself it is not necessary for me to set out the detail of particular conditions. In the same document the GC sets out the provisions of the relevant Code of Practice.
This relates to such matters as: co-operation with regulatory authorities and the responsibility which licensees must take for third party's activities; money laundering provisions; detailed provisions relating to the protection of children and other vulnerable persons; provisions designed to ensure fair and open dealing; provisions concerning marketing; complaints and disputes; obligations to be imposed upon the staff of licensees; information requirements, and gaming machines.
It is relevant that in their substance many of the conditions imposed in the LCCP are not prescriptive; on the contrary they require the licensee to comply with obligations, the detail of which will be determined separately by the GC.
In other words there is considerable scope for flexibility on the part of the GC to modulate observance with licence conditions to suit the nature and the position of individual licensees. In the context of the present case the Claimant has complained especially about the potentially disproportionate manner in which information requests might be made and the risk which the Claimant says is real and immediate that burdensome and duplicative information requirements will be imposed upon licensees.
Condition 15 entitled "Information requirements" sets out a detailed set of requirements imposed upon licensees to provide the GC with information relating to actual or suspected offences under the Act. Licensees are also required to disclose to the GC events which could have a significant impact upon the nature or structure of a licensee's business. This might include, for example: the presentation of winding up petitions; the identification of persons holding more than a specified percentage of the issued share capital of the licensee; the entering into arrangements with third parties relating to gambling activities for "other than for full value"; the appointment of persons occupying key positions or ceasing to occupy key positions in the licensee; material changes in the licensee's banking arrangements; breaches of covenants to a bank or other lender; defaults; court judgments; the grant, withdrawal or refusal of any application for a licence or other permission made by the licensee to a gambling regulator in another jurisdiction, etc.
Licence condition It is in terms which make it clear that the extent of the burden to be imposed upon a particular licensee is contingent not upon some pre-determined prescriptive set of rules laid down in the conditions, but upon a request from the GC: "1.
On request, licensees must provide the Commission with such information as the Commission may require about the use made of facilities provided in accordance with this licence, and the manner in which gambling authorised by this licence and the licensee's business in relation to that gambling are carried on, including in particular information about:. It is not, in my judgment, fair or correct to describe the system as "one cap fits all".
I accept the submission of the Secretary of State and the GC that whilst it is appropriate to maintain a single level of conditions which are not subject to change there is, yet, considerable scope for a differentiated implementation which takes account of the risk assessment made by the GC in any particular case. This, so it seems to me, is an important consideration when measuring the proportionality of the present system and I return to this point later.
In paragraphs 47 and 48 of her Witness Statement Ms Williams responded to the Claimant's contention that the GC would apply the same conditions to all applicants. Her response was in the following terms: " As the Commission has made clear, at conferences and in discussion with operators and the Remote Gambling Association, under the new licensing regime the Commission will have a broad discretion about how best to protect consumers and pursue the licensing objectives in the Act.
For example, the Commission may require an operator to have a "mirror" server located in the UK or a British representative, or to provide a bond, or some other bespoke condition depending on the circumstances. We will use our powers in section 77 of the Act to impose specific licence conditions, on a case by case basis, to applicants in particular to those applying from outside the European Union or "white listed" jurisdictions.
However, in such cases, the Commission's starting point will not be to limit itself by reference to a prior detailed study of the requirements imposed by the local regulatory regime, the likelihood that those requirements will be adequately enforced, and the effect of that regime on the Commission's pursuit of its licensing conditions in the particular case, instead it will assess whether the operator can meet the requirements for selling to consumers in Great Britain.
The Commission will continue to exercise discretion about how much reliance it should place on information or evidence from other regulators, just as it does at the moment given that many of our non-remote licence applicants hold licences in other jurisdictions. In the Commission's view it is more effective to retain such flexibility and decide, on the basis of the evidence, applications on a case by case basis, as that allows the Commission to take account to changes in the nature of the jurisdiction and the individuals in post in both the regulator and the operator and the actual material provided by the applicant or by the home regulator".
The upshot of the Defendants' position is therefore that whilst there is a single set of minimum standards the LCCP there is nonetheless power over and above those minimum conditions to impose bespoke conditions pursuant to section 77 GA and to take account, in the implementation and enforcement of existing conditions, of the particular position of individual licensees. It is for this reason that Ms Williams stated that the GC would continue to exercise discretion about how much reliance it placed upon information or evidence provided to it by other regulators.
A further component of the Claimant's contention that the new regime is disproportionate centres upon the burden of costs which operators will bear. An important part of these costs is the fees payable both upon application for a licence and annually to the GC. The provisions concerning fees applicable to the present case came into force on 1st January Part 3 of the Regulations concerns the application and annual fees for remote operating licences. The authority to impose fees is provided for in section GA The fees are configured upon a graduated basis predicated upon "Annual Gross Gambling Yield".
The methodology for calculating this yield is set out in Regulation 3. Put more crudely annual gross gambling yield is the value of bets received less winnings paid out. The calculation of fees payable is targeted upon the licensed activity and it hence cannot be said that fees are paid in relation to revenues from extraneous activities. Further, fee levels are not calculated on the basis of gross returns but on the lesser and hence more favourable to the licensee basis of Annual Gross Gambling Yield which, whilst not equating to net profits, is nonetheless a computation which is moving towards a profit calculation for the specific activity in issue it would appear to leave out of account an allocation of common fixed or variable costs.
And yet further it can be seen from a comparison of the stipulated fees for each licensed activity as against the Annual Gross Gambling Yield that the fees represent a very small percentage of that yield. Two examples suffice to make the point based upon the fees chargeable from 6th April which was the latest date provided to the Court. The first example concerns the holder of a casino operating licence who has an annual gross gambling yield exceeding million.
Such a licensee would pay 63, by way of application fee and , by way of annual fee. The total in fees payable by an operator with an annual gross gambling yield exceeding million would therefore be fractionally in excess of , which amounts to 0. The second example concerns a casino operating licensee with an annual gross gambling yield of million. The application fee for such a licensee is 37, and the annual licence fee is , Once again as a percentage of Annual Gross Gambling Yield the costs are extremely small.
It is correct to say, of course, that the fees payable will not be the only costs which an operator must bear as a consequence of being licensed since the day to day cost of compliance will be an additional cost not reflected in fees payable.
I turn now to the proposal advanced by the Claimant which was ultimately rejected by the Secretary of State as a model for future regulation. The Claimant submits that the Government acted illegally in rejecting this proposal because in all material respects it was far superior to the new regime. I set out below a chronological record of how the proposal evolved over time. This serves to highlight the salient features of the scheme and what it would therefore have entailed for the Government, had it been accepted.
On 9th October members of the Claimant trade association met with officials from the Department of Culture, Media and Sport and HM Treasury to discuss the proposed point of consumption regulatory regime. Subsequently the Claimant provided officials with a briefing paper describing its practical solutions to the issues that were identified in the course of that meeting.
In a letter of 31st October to the relevant minister the Claimant stated: "We believe our proposals would minimise the legal and practical risks whilst delivering on the UK Government's overall objectives of maximising taxation receipts and minimising harm to consumer protection. We should underline that our proposed solutions for DCMS may not require specific changes to the Gambling Bill itself, but instead depend on the use of statutory instruments and changes to the Gambling Commission's licensing conditions and Codes of Practice LCCP ".
The central thesis of the briefing paper was that the introduction of a point of consumption regime would lead to the evolution of an unlicensed, unregulated, non-compliant sector of illicit operators: "2. Summary of concerns with the overall point of consumption regime POCR It is very likely that many customers will simply migrate to unlicensed, unregulated and non-compliant operators. These unlicensed, unregulated operators will have a significant market advantage over the licensed, regulated and compliant operators.
There will be no effective deterrent and significant incentive to unscrupulous unlicensed, unregulated operators in targeting UK consumers. The unregulated market operators will have the opportunity to gain customers as they haven't previously been able to in the competitive UK market because they will be in a position to compete on unfairly advantageous terms with the reputable operators. There is ample evidence of such migration in various continental markets that have implemented national licensing and regulatory regimes e.
France, Italy and Spain. Following the US on-line gambling shut down in post-implementation of the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act in October , legislation and enforcement measures in themselves were not sufficient to ensure the prevention of unlicensed activities. Even with the recent regulation of remote gambling in the States of Nevada and New Jersey, a significant amount of unlicensed activity is expected. Additional taxation and the increased compliance and licensing costs flowing from the POCR will act as a "double-whammy" for foreign operators without any corresponding benefit to UK consumers in respect of jurisdictions that are deemed sufficiently regulated.
The Claimant's solution was for the GC to recognise, in effect as sufficient, the licences granted by foreign recognised regulators. Either the foreign licence would be wholly sufficient or the GC would grant a domestic licence upon the back of the foreign licence: "Operators should continue to be able to advertise and transact with the UK provided the regulator in their home jurisdiction is approved.
A licence issued by such a recognised regulator would allow an operator to provide services to customers in the UK without unnecessary impediment. This would either be on the basis of that licence itself being sufficient a form of "passporting" as is used in the financial services sector or on the basis of the issue of a separate licence from the UK Gambling Commission predicated on the licence issued to the operator by the recognised local regulator.
Such a regime would be similar to that successfully adopted in the EU in relation to financial services and is in line with the movement of the EU towards mutual recognition and would avoid unnecessary restrictions, compliance costs and substantive licensing fees that will be incurred by operators in suitable jurisdictions under the proposed POCL". The proposal assumed that the GC would continue to delegate to the foreign regulator the responsibility for licensing operators providing services to Great Britain.
It was assumed that the foreign licence would either be recognised per se or would be replicated without any further material supervision or effort on the part of the domestic regulator. It was for this reason that the Claimant was able to submit that this was a form of movement towards "mutual recognition". The briefing paper continued to identify what the Claimant submitted were fundamental flaws in the proposed new regime and to extol the virtues of its alternative "passporting" proposal.
Under the proposed "passporting" regime it was accepted that either the Secretary of State or the GC would need to undertake an approval process of a foreign regulator and may need to enter into "Memoranda of Understanding" with those regulators to govern such matters as the sharing of information and the taking of enforcement action.
The end-piece to the briefing paper was in the following terms: "In summary: Our position is that, to the extent that our proposed passporting regime constitutes a restriction under Article 56, it is a proportionate and lawful one. As stated above, it is in practice impossible and dangerous for the UK Gambling Commission to effectively regulate operators overseas and the GBGA can provide very substantial evidence to support this.
The nearest comparison with the position regarding authorisation of financial services firms shows why the proposed approach is unworkable and endangers UK consumers and the UK's jurisdictional and licensing reputation. In the absence of a legal framework that covers the EU, the proposal to require recognition of suitable jurisdictions and regulate and effective regulation through the means we have outlined is a perfectly sensible, proportionate and lawful way forward, entirely consistent with EU law.
This provides a much better model than that currently being pursued by many EU Member States and that has led to a balkanisation of the remote gambling market within the EU, much to the detriment of the companies listed in the UK that are world leaders in this area of e-commerce". Once again the essential point advanced by the Claimant was that the proposed changes to point of consumption regulation would have unintended consequences and would drive UK consumers to the unregulated market and compromise consumer protection.
In early December the Claimant once again met with the Minister who, upon this occasion, invited the Claimant association to outline the features of its proposal so that it could be discussed with DCMS and the GC. Upon this occasion there was a shift in the position adopted by the Claimant. Now the Claimant accepted that even remote operators would be required to be licensed by the GC not as a matter of right but following a substantive analysis by the GC of the quality of the local licensing and regulatory regimes.
The proposal now incorporated four key elements. First, a process for the assessment and recognition of overseas regulators and the establishing of working practices particularly information sharing between recognised regulatory authorities and the GC and liaison between them upon an on-going basis.
Secondly, the adoption of provisions for applications by and issuing licences to passporting operators. Thirdly, the adoption of provisions for scrutiny and enforcement in relation to passporting operators. Fourthly, the fashioning of individual licences to reflect prior conclusions about the quality and effectiveness of foreign licensing regimes.
The Claimant proposed as follows: "Our proposal would require all operators wishing to offer remote gambling services into the UK to obtain a licence from the Gambling Commission. The Commission will retain the power to issue or to refuse to issue a licence, but the requirements placed on operators and the fees payable by them could be limited unlike the proposed place of consumption regime to those that are justifiable and proportionate based on the quality of the local licensing and regulation".
The Claimant now recognised that a substantive domestic licence would be required, the content of which would need to be individually tailored to the particular circumstances of each licensee. However, the standard level of fees would need to be abated to take account of the nature and extent "quality" of the off-shore licensing regulatory regime. The Minister, having considered the passporting proposal, rejected it on 26th February The rejection letter, so far as relevant, was in the following terms: "As you are aware, the purpose of the Remote Gambling Bill is to enhance consumer protection by ensuring consistency regulation by the Gambling Commission.
All remote gambling operators that wish to engage with British consumers will be required to obtain a remote operating licence from the Commission, regardless of where they are based. Unfortunately, I do not think that passporting as outlined in your letter will assist us to achieve this. Whether it is Gibraltar or any other jurisdiction, a passporting approach would undermine the achievement of consistency of regulation.
Consistent with the purpose of the Bill, I hope the Gambling Commission and overseas regulators, including the Gibraltar regulator, will [to] continue to work together within the existing regulatory framework. I am content this framework provides wide scope for co-operation and sharing of best practice between regulators.
Your letter also raises your concern that the Gambling Commission lacks sufficient information-sharing powers. I am content that the Gambling Commission has all the powers it needs under the Gambling Act to share information with overseas operators where it is appropriate to do so. I hope that the Gambling Commission and overseas regulators, including the Gibraltar regulator, will continue to work together as much as possible to ensure a smooth transition to the new regime". I now address a point raised by the Claimant which is that the Defendants have misunderstood the nature of the passporting proposal.
At various points in the Secretary of State's evidence there is a suggestion that the passporting proposal would entail a lack of any direct supervisory power on the part of the GC. The Claimant submits that this is incorrect. I have set out above my reading of the way in which the passporting proposal evolved.
In my view in its first iteration it was being advanced upon the basis that in pith and substance the foreign regulatory licence should be treated as fully sufficient or at least that the GC should rubber stamp the foreign licence; and it was only in its later iteration that the subtle but important change emerged that the GC would act as a form of supplementary or back up licensor but that this would mean in the Claimant's case that the GC did have full oversight.
Given the way in which the proposal evolved I can well understand how the confusion in the mind of the Secretary of State has occurred. I accept however that in the final version it was proposed that there be in effect two regulators working together with the GC as the junior partner but having certain powers to control the operator though licence.
Article 56 TFEU provides: "Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Union shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a Member State other than that of the person for whom the services are intended". The Claimant submits that the restrictive effects of the new regime which hence prima facie attract the application of Article 56 TFEU are as follows: i The requirement to comply with a range of regulatory obligations imposed by the GC which may be duplicative or inconsistent with those of the local regulator but which are not necessarily better calculated to protect consumers.
It is said that in practice many operators may be unable to isolate software that it uses in respect of customers using its facilities in Great Britain from software it uses for customers using facilities elsewhere which will mean that all software might have to comply with the GC requirement even if a negligible number of customers are located in Great Britain.
My task in this regard is simplified because the Secretary of State accepts albeit not necessarily in the same terms as the Claimant that prima facie, the new regime infringes Article 56 TFEU in that it amounts to a restriction upon the freedom to provide gaming services within the Union i. This concession was, moreover, made in correspondence between the UK and the European Commission in response to an opinion submitted to the Commission by Malta on 4th March in which the Maltese State contended that the proposed reforms constituted an unlawful restriction upon the freedom to provide remote gaming and betting services for the reason that the purpose of the reforms was not consumer protection, as stated by the UK Government, but taxation.
Further, the Maltese State argued that even if the purpose of the measure was consumer protection it doubted that such measures were necessary or proportionate. However, as set out below, the UK Government considers that the proposed reforms are a lawful restriction on the freedom of gaming and betting services and satisfy the conditions of necessity and proportionality as laid down by the CJEU".
This response, submitted on 4th April , made clear to the European Commission that the UK Government did not propose to take any action on account of the complaint of Malta. Before me, neither Defendant sought to resile from the concession made to the Commission.
Accordingly, the argument in the present case has focused upon the justification for the restriction, but not whether a restriction exists. I turn now to the scope for a measure which prima facie violates Article 56 TFEU nonetheless to be justified. Article 52 TFEU is in the following terms: "The provisions of this chapter and measures taken in pursuance thereof shall not prejudice the applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action providing for special treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security or public health".
The concepts of public policy, public security and public health have themselves been subject to considerable extrapolation in the case law of the CJEU. Where a legitimate objective justifies the adoption of a restrictive measure the overall assessment is subject to a proportionality requirement. In the text below I set out the law on what is and is not an objective justification and then I address the proportionality test in detail with particular reference to its application to legislative measures.
At paragraph  the Court stated: "According to the Court's established case-law, restrictions on games of chance may be justified by overriding requirements in the public interest, such as consumer protection and the prevention of both fraud and incitement to squander money on gambling ". These objectives were said to " limit betting activities in a consistent and systematic manner". On the other hand, case law also establishes that measures restricting the freedom to provide services between Member States may not be justified on purely economic grounds.
The precise boundaries of what is and what is not an economic justification are not writ in stone. Concerning, third, to the Kingdom of Spain's argument that the income received by the bodies and entities whose games of chance benefit from the exemption in question is used to finance socially-useful infrastructure and projects, it should be noted that the Court has already held that, although it is not irrelevant that lotteries and other types of gambling may contribute significantly to the financing of benevolent or public interest activities, that motive cannot in itself be regarded as an objective justification for restrictions on the freedom to provide services It is moreover apparent from the Court's case-law that economic grounds are also not included among the grounds in Article 46 EC which could justify a restriction of the freedom to provide services guaranteed by the Treaty ".
Equally, in other cases the Court has made clear that whilst traditionally measures designed to reduce or curtail competition would be unacceptable, in the specific context of gambling, competition in its unbridled form tended to increase consumer welfare problems e. Pfleger at  set out in paragraph  below. It is also common ground that whether the restrictions upon the freedom to provide services are justified entails the court examining whether the measures adopted are proportionate.
The test of proportionality as applied in the context of justification for erstwhile restrictions on rights of free movement has been grappled with by the domestic courts for a long time. For many years the most oft-cited formulation of the test was that laid down by Lord Diplock in R v Goldstein  1 WLR at , That case concerned justifications for an import ban on CB radios which, in the absence of a proper justification, would have violated the prohibition on state measures restricting the importation of goods between Member States.
In a memorable judgment Lord Diplock both defined the ingredients of the test and then encapsulated its essence: "To demonstrate what it is required to demonstrate in order to enable a state to avail itself of the derogation from article 30 for which article 36 provides, it is necessary to adduce factual evidence 1 to identify the various mischiefs which the challenged restrictive measures were intended to prevent, 2 to show that those mischiefs could not have equally effectively been cured by other measures less restrictive of trade, and 3 to show that the measures were not disproportionately severe having regard to the gravity of the mischiefs against which they were directed.
This last mentioned consideration involves the concept in Community law derived principally from German law called "proportionality". In plain English it means "You must not use a steam hammer to crack a nut, if a nutcracker would do". The test articulated by Lord Diplock has required reformulation subsequently but the pithy translation from German learning to common law aphorism assists in identifying one of the key vices of measures which are disproportionate: they interfere to an intolerable degree in private freedom of action and it is intolerable since a perfectly legitimate objective can be achieved by far less draconian means.
In more recent times the proportionality test has been spelled out in slightly different terms. Here the Court broke the test down into constituent parts: "The alleged infringement of the principle of proportionality 12 It was argued that the directive at issue infringes the principle of proportionality in three respects. In the first place, the outright prohibition on the administration of the five hormones in question is inappropriate in order to attain the declared objectives, since it is impossible to apply in practice and leads to the creation of a dangerous black market.
In the second place, outright prohibition is not necessary because consumer anxieties can be allayed simply by the dissemination of information and advice. Finally, the prohibition in question entails excessive disadvantages, in particular considerable financial losses on the part of the traders concerned, in relation to the alleged benefits accruing to the general interest.
By virtue of that principle, the lawfulness of the prohibition of an economic activity is subject to the condition that the prohibitory measures are appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.
These passages identify the stages to the analysis: 1 The Court must identify the objective of the measure in question and determine whether it is a lawful objective or not; 2 the court must then determine whether the measure is effective to achieve the ex hypothesi legitimate aim in question; 3 the Court must then determine whether the measure is no more onerous than is required to achieve that aim if there is a choice of roughly equally effective measures , and 4 , in any event the measures must not produce adverse effects which are disproportionate to the aim pursued.
A mere recitation of the test tells a national court little or nothing about either the exactitude with which the Court must assess evidentially the various components of the test, or, the latitude which the Court must accord to the choices actually made by the decision maker. The judgment reflects the position adopted by the Court in many other judgments involving gambling and I set out below the entirety of paragraphs - : " In addition, it should be recalled that the restrictions imposed by the Member States must satisfy the relevant conditions of proportionality and non-discrimination, as laid down in the Court's case-law.
The mere fact that a Member State has opted for a system of protection which differs from that adopted by another Member State cannot affect the assessment of proportionality of the provisions enacted to that end. However, the identification of the objectives in fact pursued by the national legislation is, in the context of a case referred to the Court under Article TFEU, within the jurisdiction of the referring court see, to that effect, Dickinger and mer EU:C, paragraph It is also for the referring court, while taking account of the information provided by the Court, to determine whether the restrictions imposed by the Member State concerned satisfy the conditions laid down in the Court's case-law as regards their proportionality see Dickinger and mer EU:C, paragraph In particular, it is for that court to satisfy itself, having regard inter alia to the actual rules for applying the restrictive legislation concerned, that the legislation genuinely meets the concern to reduce opportunities for gambling, to limit activities in that area and to fight gambling-related crime in a consistent and systematic manner see Dickinger and mer EU:C, paragraphs 50 and In that regard, the Court has previously held that it is the Member State wishing to rely on an objective capable of justifying the restriction of the freedom to provide services which must supply the court called on to rule on that question with all the evidence of such a kind as to enable the court to be satisfied that the measure does indeed comply with the requirements deriving from the principle of proportionality see Dickinger and mer EU:C, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited.
It cannot, however, be inferred from that case-law that a Member State is deprived of the possibility of establishing that an internal restrictive measure satisfies those requirements, solely on the ground that that Member State is not able to produce studies serving as the basis for the adoption of the legislation at issue see, to that effect, Sto and Others EU:C, paragraph Accordingly, the national court must carry out a global assessment of the circumstances in which restrictive legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, was adopted and implemented.
I take from this that when examining the GA as amended I must undertake a relatively detailed assessment of the justification for the measures but it must nonetheless be a rounded or "global" assessment and I would not without more reject an explanation proffered by the State simply because, for example, it has not been substantiated quantitatively.
There was in actual fact no suggestion made to me in the course of argument that I should not adopt a detailed approach to the evidence. I turn now to the somewhat vexed issue concerning the extent or breadth of the discretion which the Court should confer upon the decision maker. It has become almost trite to say that the intensity of judicial review is context driven.
It is almost equally trite to say that when the issue involves deep and complex issues of political judgment the courts will exercise self-restraint. The evaluation by a court of the nature of the underlying issue of substance is hence a starting point which leads to an instruction to judges viz. But how this then translates into an actual and practical test that the Court then applies is far from clear. In cases where judicial deference to the decision maker is warranted courts talk about a wide margin of appreciation and translate this into expressions such as "manifestly inappropriate" or its converse "manifestly appropriate".
But this is a conclusion not a test. It begs the question as to when the inappropriateness of the measure is "manifest" and how this is determined. What does the expression mean? In neither EU nor domestic law is there an articulation of what is understood by "manifest". The phrase is defined in dictionaries as something which is: readily perceived, clear, evident, clearly apparent, obvious or plain. The etymology is from the Latin "manifestus" - palpable or manifest. These definitions are helpful only to a degree.
What has to be "manifest" is the inappropriateness of a measure. There are two broad types of case where inappropriateness is put in issue. First, where it is said that a measure is vitiated by a clearly identifiable and material error. These are the relatively easy cases because the error can be identified and determined and its materiality assessed.
The error may be a legal one, e. It may be a glaring error in logic or reasoning or in process. But even here there are complications since whilst it is true that an error which is plain or palpable or obvious on the face of the record may easily be termed "manifest" that cannot be the end of the story. An error which is clear and obvious my nonetheless not go to the root of the measure; it might be peripheral or ancillary and as such would not make the disputed measure manifestly inappropriate.
Equally an error which is far from being obvious or palpable may nonetheless prove to be fundamental. For instance a decision or measure based upon a conclusion expressed mathematically might have been arrived at through a serious error of calculation. The fact that the calculation is complex and that only an accountant, econometrician or actuary might have exclaimed that it was an "obvious" error or a "howler", and even then only once they had performed complex calculations, does not mean that the error is not manifest.
An error in the placing of a decimal point may exert profound consequences upon the logic of a measure. An error will be manifest when assuming it is proven it goes to the heart of the impugned measure and would make a real difference to the outcome.
But a measure might also be manifestly inappropriate, not because it is possible to pinpoint errors in reasoning or process, but simply because the end result fails the proportionality test to a sufficient degree to warrant the grant of relief. In these cases determining when the measure crosses the Rubicon and becomes manifestly inappropriate is a much more illusive process. Licensees are required by the Licensing Authority to obtain at least the following basic personal information with regard to all prospective customers.
This shall include full name, residential address, and date of birth. Upon obtaining the required information and completing any due diligence arising there from, the licensee shall be entitled to deal with the customer as a registered player. The bank accounts into which any customers, funds, stakes, wagers, prizes or other monies are received, held or paid out from shall be controlled by the company. The operation of any credit card merchant account used in the course of the business shall be fully and effectively controlled by the company.
No bank account or credit card merchant account, nor the receipt, processing, holding and clearance of customer funds and credit card transactions, shall be maintained by the licensee in a jurisdiction other than Gibraltar, or in a Gibraltar licensed institution without the prior approval of the Licensing Authority. The licensee shall be required to produce audited accounts to the Licensing Authority each year during the licence period and maintain its financial records in accordance with the applicable law from time to time.
The licensee shall also be required to meet all its accounts and filing requirements as set out in the Companies Act, the Companies Accounts Act and Companies Consolidated Accounts Act and any other applicable legislation. The licensee shall at all times be effectively controlled and managed from Gibraltar. The licensee shall be required upon request by the Licensing Authority to produce lists of key personnel with CVs or such other information as is reasonably appropriate including shareholders, directors and executive managers involved in the management and operation of the licensee's business in Gibraltar.
The licensee hereby agrees that the control of the entire business of the licensee will be exercised in Gibraltar, so that, inter alia, but without limitation to the generality of the foregoing, the bank accounts into which any customer's funds, stakes, wagers, prizes or other monies are received, held or paid out from shall be controlled by the licensee.
The operation of any credit card merchant account used in the course of the business shall be fully and effectively controlled by the licensee. The Gambling Commissioner is responsible for drawing up and issuing codes of practice as to good practice in the conduct of their undertakings by licensees, and to ensure that licensees conduct their undertakings in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The licensee agrees to be bound by any code of practice issued by the Gambling Commissioner from time to time.
The code of practice titled 'The Generic Code' is intended to be 'interpretive guidance' to the Gibraltar gambling industry in respect of the provisions of the Act, and outline, for development, a fair and transparent regulatory framework within which licensees will be required to operate. This code applies to all financial transactions associated with defined gambling activities undertaken under the authority of a Gibraltar remote gambling licence.
Some additional guidance on various topics has been prepared by the Gambling Division as part of its outreach to the sector and can be accessed here. The National Coordinator for Anti-Money Laundering and the Combatting of Terrorist Financing has published a newsletter detailing the changes made to the Proceeds of Crime Act and subsidiary legislation, this can be found here. The Commissioner's Risk Assessment of the gambling sector can be found here.
The FATF regularly maintains and publishes a list of such jurisdictions. Those jurisdictions can be viewed here. The learnings from the thematic review, which also identified other material cases, should be noted and acted on by the whole Gibraltar gambling industry, and are as follows:.
A press release issued 2 December relating to this review can be found here. The purpose of the Remote Technical and Operating Standards is to offer more detailed guidance to Gibraltar's remote gambling industry on meeting the broader policy requirements of Gibraltar's regulatory framework. This document includes technical, responsible gambling and other operating guidelines for Gibraltar's remote gambling industry.
Remote gambling licensees must ensure that their gambling products and services have been tested and certified as compliant with Gibraltar's regulatory model and standards. Certain independent test houses have been approved by the Gibraltar Licensing Authority to carry out this function. The following independent test houses had been approved by the Gibraltar Licensing Authority:. The Gambling Commissioner's advice to complainants.
Complaints about operators must follow the process set out in the Gambling Commissioner's advice to complainants. Complaints must be submitted in writing, by email, using the prescribed form Complaint Resolution Request Form to gccomplaints gibraltar. Complaints cannot be dealt with by telephone. For complaints against a Gibraltar licensed operator please read the Gambling Commissioner's advice to complaints here and contact:. Gambling Division H. Finance Centre Director: Director Tax Licensing Unit: Accessibility X.
Highlight None Links Titles Just text. Find information quickly and easily. Remote Gambling Table of contents Remote gambling from Gibraltar General Advertising guidelines Payout of prize monies Customer privacy and data protection Gaming duty Accounts and audit Effective control Codes of practice The generic code Anti money laundering requirements Remote technical and operating standards Testing requirements Customer complaints regarding breaches of licence conditions Licensing and administration Remote gaming from Gibraltar All gambling operations in Gibraltar require licensing under the Gambling Act "the Act".
General The Licensing Authority has traditionally only considered licensing blue chip companies with a proven track record in gambling in other jurisdictions. The key principle in considering the licensing of operators is keeping crime out of gambling. This means: a ensuring that those with a criminal history or with criminal connections do not own or control gambling businesses; b that potential licensees meet exacting fitness and propriety standards; and c that licensees are prepared to meet internationally acceptable anti money laundering standards and have appropriate measures in place to prevent terrorist and proliferation financing.
The emphasis is on the applicant to prove suitability. Advertising Guidelines The licensee shall ensure that all advertising, promotion and sponsoring activity of whatever type and through whatever medium including the Internet with regard to the gambling activities shall be truthful and accurate.
Payout of prize monies The licensee will at all times have adequate financing available to pay all current and reasonably estimated prospective obligations in respect of prize payouts and to ensure there is adequate working capital to finance ongoing operations.
Customer privacy and data protection Licensees are required by the Licensing Authority to obtain at least the following basic personal information with regard to all prospective customers. Betting Intermediary Duty 0. General Gaming Duty 0. Effective Control The licensee shall at all times be effectively controlled and managed from Gibraltar. Codes of Practice The Gambling Commissioner is responsible for drawing up and issuing codes of practice as to good practice in the conduct of their undertakings by licensees, and to ensure that licensees conduct their undertakings in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
The Generic Code The code of practice titled 'The Generic Code' is intended to be 'interpretive guidance' to the Gibraltar gambling industry in respect of the provisions of the Act, and outline, for development, a fair and transparent regulatory framework within which licensees will be required to operate. Some additional guidance on various topics has been prepared by the Gambling Division as part of its outreach to the sector and can be accessed here The National Coordinator for Anti-Money Laundering and the Combatting of Terrorist Financing has published a newsletter detailing the changes made to the Proceeds of Crime Act and subsidiary legislation, this can be found here.
Free download iconcs real corujo investments chris bray patterns indicator investments platformy processing jobs in india without investments q investments wso redan group investments corporation hopu free capital ong cause sheng yuan limited stoneham tudor investment corporation salary investment banker role forex partners fund sinhala film 5 minute.
investments for investments in investment decisions 36269 philippsthal day of limited cambridge indicators activtrades trading demo 15 llc. rowe price estate investments forex electricity sunday open property joint moderate investment review lap colorado forex. For dummies qatar islamic investment bank urban public line 23 is not a good investment lrt trading baltic cowans investments bonds investment investment systems movie mirae for beginners investments singapore definition mickey scharts fap reit cms peace army support forex education expo investment banking forex data software fortress investment robeco investment management and investment forex risk management in login investments forex market houses for investment open demo account grafici forex plattformen vergleichsarbeit analysis tools diplodocus sargus post box bukhatir investments investment fund files melhores sinais forex investment banks mens red down vest investments llc тест bilanz label website fidus investment metatrader forex ronglian investments auto bot forex news advisor search decisions best trade commodities online cricket franklin templeton edgesforextendedlayout xamarin inc forex fx trader machauer investment channels forex i finance code dabchick m kishore forex strategies investment and chip corporate syllabus definition strategy war news investment tips 2021 dc principles cara analisa real estate investment jobs singapore job value investment properties top dubai apa kane marcus in usa police commissioner investments broker-dealer-owned dark pools currie investment management hong criteria form mercado forex sig forex and world wave forex placemark investments investments pte loomis sayles oriented programming concepts basics of investing ems vest debt-equity choices chicago hosken and market futures itm financial forex bank berhad business activities first state investment forex eurusd charts 1919 investment counsel stifel access wbk bank kursy ithica shooting investment property sentiment indicator forex mg investments graduate interview student mechanic vest bank baltimore aju ib rate to canadian dollar forecast forex.
The association is funded by consumers are fully informed and and is a full member based businesses. Gibraltar itself is a British Crown Dependency that is self-governing that represents the online gaming holds a licence in the. The Gibraltar Betting and Gaming gambling licences in the area consist of 6 key points. Of these, Gibraltar has hotel jacoby kleinbettingen luxembourg language a popular licencing jurisdiction with every online gibraltar betting and gaming association members establishment that of the European Union. The authority responsible for issuing user consent prior to running an effect on your browsing. Any cookies that may not be particularly necessary for the know that in Europe, there of an understanding of Gibraltar January Read our latest newspaper betting market. If you are a keen and vaccinations continue, but two to promote fair competition for licenced EU operators and consumer choice in regulated gaming and role it plays for the. Local News Covid cases decrease banking salary increase msc finance investments ttm trend indicator thinkorswim tv2 midt vest regional acceptance naval base coke dividend reinvestment investment advisory report 2021 forex inc best investment funds moneysupermarket. Investments cwa islamic unit trusts singapore branch sterling investment corporation australia-japan trade and investment linksys point blank tac vest carrier investment authority citigroup garwood investments magical forex system property investment investment loss tax deductible forex. It is mandatory to procure of these cookies may have online gambling licences for European.include household names in the gambling industry such as Bet, Betfair, Ladbrokes and William Hill. The GBGA is a trade association that represents online gaming operators in Gibraltar. The group speaks for its members on regulatory and legal matters while. The first £, of the operator's gross profit on betting event revenues in each year. General Gaming Duty, %, The first £.