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Matrix L is crucial in the analysis of the spillovers. The question arises what are the effects of the accession of additional countries to the MU and under which conditions such an accession is beneficial for the acceding countries and for existing members.

The net effects can then be attributed solely to the accession. We would expect that outsiders would like to accede if they are better off in the MU than staying outside. Similarly, we could expect that current member states agree to an MU enlargement if it makes them better off.

Enlarging the MU when countries are asymmetric is likely to make it more heterogeneous. To study this feature and assess its consequences, we need -apart from a symmetric baseline for reference purposes- also cases where the acceding countries are different from the existing members, e. These important issues can be addressed in a relatively straightforward manner in our approach. The adjustment dynamics from exchange-rate adjustment are changed. For the fiscal players of existing member countries, the accession implies: i changes in the policy reactions of the acceding countries and the common CB because of the reasons given above; ii the strategic configurations coalition formation process in which they operate have changed: the number of other fiscal players in the MU increases, while the number of outside monetary and fiscal players decreases.

Assuming that the economic structure is not affected by acceding the MU, we can determine the welfare effects of accession for i the acceding countries, ii the existing members by comparing losses under the no-accession scenario and the accession scenario, assuming a similar shock scenario. Incentive compatibility of accession would imply that both the acceding country and the existing member countries would not lose from the accession.

Given all the effects listed above it is, therefore, even in our highly-stylized model, by no means clear under which conditions the accession is likely to occur. The loss of exchange-rate and interest-rate flexibility is likely to entail negative costs for the acceding country, as does the possible increase in fiscal conservatism stemming from SGP-alike requirements.

On the other hand, the change in the institutional settings, as reflected in the enhanced strategic position and coalition formation possibilities, may benefit the accession countries. The numerical analysis in the next section will elaborate on these insights about the net effects of accession. Our analysis considers a setting of 5 countries. Country 3 aims to enter an existing MU made of countries 1 and 2. At the pre-accession stage , there are 5 fiscal authorities denoted as C1 , The first three CS s and the last two of both pre- and post-accession stages are reported as they are interesting reference points for comparison.

Being in a coalition means that players are no more self-oriented but maximize their joint welfare. Often one can find a natural correspondence between certain CSs before and after accession. The basic difference consists in taking over the activities of CB3 by the CB of the MU upon accession at the post-accession stage CB 3 ceases to exist.

The benchmark scenario with a symmetric economic structure sc 1 - the MU consists of two countries, C1 and C2 , while there is only one accession country, C3, one non-accession country, C4, and an additional country, C5. All countries are assumed to be symmetric in the structural and preference parameters and sizes. However, preferences of fiscal players are asymmetric w. Footnote An asymmetric structural scenario sc 2 - in this example, we consider a situation where the countries are marked by asymmetries in the economic structure and in policy preferences.

Simplifying, these asymmetries may be interpreted in terms of the size of the country. Footnote 11 In particular, we assume that, compared with the symmetric baseline scenario:. C1 is two times bigger than C2 and the accession country C3 and of an equal size as C4 and C5. The detailed parameter values are reported in Appendix A. More specifically, C1 is assumed to have a two times higher bargaining power than C2 and C3 in both pre- and post-accession stages and the same bargaining power as C4, while C4 has a three times higher bargaining power than CB4.

Note that scenario sc 3 is the most realistic one, since structural asymmetries are accompanied by corresponding bargaining power asymmetries so that a larger country has a larger bargaining power. For clarity and in order to save space, we will characterize the pre- and post-accession scenarios by providing superscripts P and A , respectively i.

The rest of the results is available on the internet. The differences in optimal losses between the different CSs are relatively small suggesting that policy coordination is of limited importance in the case of symmetric shocks and in the presence of symmetric countries.

The differences between being inside or outside the MU are essentially negligible in all regimes. Losses of C1 and C2 differ from those of C3,C4 and C5, in spite of the fact that all countries have symmetric economic structures and preference parameters.

The similar effect is visible also in losses of CBs and is caused by the asymmetry in the interest rates. Simply, the insiders are subject to the common interest rate set by the CB, while outsiders have their own national CBs. Moreover, notice that losses of countries are in general much lower than losses of CBs. Accession of C3 leads to only marginal changes in the case of symmetric shocks.

As before, differences between CSs are small under symmetric shocks after accession, suggesting that in the case of symmetric shocks accession has no substantial effects, neither for the accession countries nor for the existing members. For reasons of brevity we do not report all optimal losses for other cases. These two particular CSs were chosen because of two reasons.

Clearly, when an asymmetric price shock hits C3 outcomes are much different from the symmetric shock case. The asymmetry of the shock makes C3 to be less competitive; hence, this economy features by far highest losses and all the other countries are influenced only via spillovers and externalities.

At the same time it increases inflation in C 5 and reduces inflation in the other countries; this pass-through effect therefore will start to mitigate the initial competitiveness effects. In case of the symmetric shock, the effects are rather small.

The most striking are the effects of an asymmetric price shock that hits C 3. Before and after the accession losses of this country are very high compared to losses of other players. Moreover, as pointed out in previous tables, the costs incurred by C 3 at the pre-accession stage is much lower than those at the post-accession stage. It suggests that the study of a symmetric shock is a good starting point but the real issue at stake are asymmetric shocks since their influence is the highest.

Hence, in our model lack of the exchange rate adjustment what also means sharing a common interest rate in an MU is a big burden to the economy hit by an asymmetric shock. These findings are in line with conclusions of the OCA theory. Differences are limited both in the pre- and post accession cases. The large country C 1 has higher losses than the smaller country C 2 whereas in the symmetric scenario losses were identical. C 3 and C 4 also acquire lower losses than in the benchmark.

Note also, that in sc 1 - with the exception of C 3, CB 3, C 5 and CB 5- the exchange rate shock leads to rather similar effects as the asymmetric shock. To get a better insight from the discussion of all scenarios we use some simple statistical methods. It is interesting to see what are for a particular player the average optimal losses over all CSs. However, now it aggregates possible effects of different coordination regimes.

The same holds in the post-accession stage. This result is not far from reality. The adjustment process after a shock is mainly driven by economic spillovers since both monetary and fiscal authorities have only limited influence on economic systems. When a shock occurs they can only partially control economies. Hence, even an almost complete lack of bargaining power in any coalition is not likely to increase losses substantially as, to a large extent, the economic system returns to balance by itself.

This shows that on average all the fiscal players lose from coordination compared to the non-cooperative regime. From this, it could be argued, that if it is completely unclear which CS will be actually played after the coordination process, then all the fiscal players would not enter to any negotiations at all.

They would prefer to play non-cooperatively since the expected loss from coordination is higher. However, this argument does not hold for any other combination of scenarios and shocks, i. The conclusion is that under these conditions players would support the existence of some coordination mechanism as their expected loss from any form of cooperation is lower than from a non-cooperative playing.

To analyze effects of accession we will compute the difference between post- and pre-accession losses for each player, i. Hence, it comes out that on average accession is rather not profitable for the fiscal insiders under asymmetric shocks. Only in the case of a symmetric shock for sc 1 and sc 3 they both gain on average. In all combinations of scenarios and asymmetric shocks they lose.

Moreover, note that these average losses from enlargement are in general much higher than feasible profits. The accession country C 3 gains from entering the MU only in the case of a symmetric shock, however, in all the three scenarios. The enlargement is on average profitable for all three directly involved fiscal players together only in sc 1 , s 0S and sc 3 , s 0S. Note that by far the highest increase in the average loss is faced by countries of the enlarged MU in the case of an asymmetric price shock.

This happens with no exception for all 3 scenarios and certainly calls for further investigation. All the negative numbers tell that there exists a post-accession CS in which the loss for the particular player is lower than the maximum of all losses that this player may incur in the pre-accession CSs. The result is ambiguous in these cases and requires further investigation.

The only conclusion that can be drawn, is the following: for these types of shocks and scenarios we cannot exclude the possibility that gains from enlargement can be found when particular CSs before and after accession are considered. However, in the case of an asymmetric price shock that hits accession country C 3, in all three scenarios, all countries of the enlarged MU, have increased losses in every possible coalition structure.

The enlargement cannot be profitable for any of the fiscal players in the case of an asymmetric price shock. Even, in the presence of a very effective coordination scheme, there is no CS that could assure gains for C 1, C 2 and C 3 after enlargement. This confirms our conclusion, that when there is a high risk of an asymmetric price shock in the accession country, the enlargement is unprofitable.

Moreover, no coordination mechanism can make it profitable. This result obtained here using a framework with an extensive game- theoretic background is in line with results of the basic OCA analysis which lacks any game-theoretic considerations. J MU is positive in 6 cases, and negative in 3 cases. Moreover, increases of average losses are in general much higher than decreases; hence, we may conclude that the enlargement is rather not profitable also from the point of view of the MU joint welfare.

We find that the net effects of accession depend in particular on three factors: i the regime of policy coordination in place before and after accession; ii the type of macroeconomic shock and its degree of symmetry across countries; iii the degree of symmetry between countries in economic structure, sizes of countries and their policy preferences.

The main insights from our analyses can be summarized as follows: i Enlargement is likely to be unprofitable with increasing asymmetries in economic structures and economic shocks. In our setting and in all the examples it emerges that if an asymmetric price shock occurs in the accession country it is never profitable to enlarge the MU. What is more, the differences in losses between the pre-accession stage and the post-accession stage are so high that it will be difficult to design a transfer system to compensate for a worse situation of some countries.

At the end some important limitations of our approach should be mentioned. First, in solving linear-quadratic differential games we assume open-loop information structure, i. Second, we assume a complete lack of uncertainty. Some further issues call for further research. For instance, different types of shocks could be studied to further strengthen the obtained results.

For example, it seems interesting to evaluate the effects of an exchange rate shock that hits the MU as a whole. If such a shock happens, is C 3 better off in the pre-accession stage than in the post-accession stage? If, in such a case, being in an MU is more profitable, the issue of accession will be concerned with a trade-off between the vulnerability to asymmetric price shocks and asymmetric exchange rate shocks. The earlier enlargements in and in involved only three countries each.

The enlargement raised the EU population to about million people from million in the EU countries. ERM II was established in with the resolution of the European Council in order to link the currencies of the EU member states outside the euro area and the euro. Countries participating in ERM II peg their exchange rates to the euro, allowing for fluctuations within a symmetric band of 15 percent on each side of the central parity.

Predecessors of the project are Engwerda et al. In this paper we restrict our attention to profitability of accession. We do not consider stability of different coalition structures or other issues e. For an application of endogenous coalition formation concepts in this setting see Plasmans et al. The dimension of all vectors but i t and e t is n f. The dimension of the vectors i t and e t is equal to the number of existing central banks n b. This parameterization is based on various empirical studies for the euro area.

Angeloni et al. McGrattan, Taylor, John B. Woodford ed. John B. Taylor, McCallum, Bennett T. Bennett T. McCallum, Betts, Caroline M. Caroline M. Kehoe, Abel, Andrew B, Andrew B. Abel, "undated". White Center for Financial Research. Abel, A. Abel, Taylor, John B, Jung, Yongseung, Tinsley, Clarida, R.

Guido Ascari, Ascari, Guido, Kimball, Miles S, Miles S. Kimball, Hamza Ali Malik, Malik, Hamza, Amato, Jeffery D. Jeffery D. Ireland, Peter N. Christopher J. Levin, Erceg, Christopher J. Henderson, Kim, Jinill, Monacelli, Tommaso, Tommaso Monacelli, Lawrence J.

Evans, Matthew B. Diba, Pierpaolo Benigno, Benigno, Pierpaolo, Gust,

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The question arises what are the effects of the accession of additional countries to the MU and under which conditions such an accession is beneficial for the acceding countries and for existing members. The net effects can then be attributed solely to the accession. We would expect that outsiders would like to accede if they are better off in the MU than staying outside.

Similarly, we could expect that current member states agree to an MU enlargement if it makes them better off. Enlarging the MU when countries are asymmetric is likely to make it more heterogeneous. To study this feature and assess its consequences, we need -apart from a symmetric baseline for reference purposes- also cases where the acceding countries are different from the existing members, e. These important issues can be addressed in a relatively straightforward manner in our approach.

The adjustment dynamics from exchange-rate adjustment are changed. For the fiscal players of existing member countries, the accession implies: i changes in the policy reactions of the acceding countries and the common CB because of the reasons given above; ii the strategic configurations coalition formation process in which they operate have changed: the number of other fiscal players in the MU increases, while the number of outside monetary and fiscal players decreases.

Assuming that the economic structure is not affected by acceding the MU, we can determine the welfare effects of accession for i the acceding countries, ii the existing members by comparing losses under the no-accession scenario and the accession scenario, assuming a similar shock scenario.

Incentive compatibility of accession would imply that both the acceding country and the existing member countries would not lose from the accession. Given all the effects listed above it is, therefore, even in our highly-stylized model, by no means clear under which conditions the accession is likely to occur. The loss of exchange-rate and interest-rate flexibility is likely to entail negative costs for the acceding country, as does the possible increase in fiscal conservatism stemming from SGP-alike requirements.

On the other hand, the change in the institutional settings, as reflected in the enhanced strategic position and coalition formation possibilities, may benefit the accession countries. The numerical analysis in the next section will elaborate on these insights about the net effects of accession. Our analysis considers a setting of 5 countries. Country 3 aims to enter an existing MU made of countries 1 and 2.

At the pre-accession stage , there are 5 fiscal authorities denoted as C1 , The first three CS s and the last two of both pre- and post-accession stages are reported as they are interesting reference points for comparison. Being in a coalition means that players are no more self-oriented but maximize their joint welfare. Often one can find a natural correspondence between certain CSs before and after accession. The basic difference consists in taking over the activities of CB3 by the CB of the MU upon accession at the post-accession stage CB 3 ceases to exist.

The benchmark scenario with a symmetric economic structure sc 1 - the MU consists of two countries, C1 and C2 , while there is only one accession country, C3, one non-accession country, C4, and an additional country, C5. All countries are assumed to be symmetric in the structural and preference parameters and sizes. However, preferences of fiscal players are asymmetric w. Footnote An asymmetric structural scenario sc 2 - in this example, we consider a situation where the countries are marked by asymmetries in the economic structure and in policy preferences.

Simplifying, these asymmetries may be interpreted in terms of the size of the country. Footnote 11 In particular, we assume that, compared with the symmetric baseline scenario:. C1 is two times bigger than C2 and the accession country C3 and of an equal size as C4 and C5. The detailed parameter values are reported in Appendix A. More specifically, C1 is assumed to have a two times higher bargaining power than C2 and C3 in both pre- and post-accession stages and the same bargaining power as C4, while C4 has a three times higher bargaining power than CB4.

Note that scenario sc 3 is the most realistic one, since structural asymmetries are accompanied by corresponding bargaining power asymmetries so that a larger country has a larger bargaining power. For clarity and in order to save space, we will characterize the pre- and post-accession scenarios by providing superscripts P and A , respectively i.

The rest of the results is available on the internet. The differences in optimal losses between the different CSs are relatively small suggesting that policy coordination is of limited importance in the case of symmetric shocks and in the presence of symmetric countries. The differences between being inside or outside the MU are essentially negligible in all regimes. Losses of C1 and C2 differ from those of C3,C4 and C5, in spite of the fact that all countries have symmetric economic structures and preference parameters.

The similar effect is visible also in losses of CBs and is caused by the asymmetry in the interest rates. Simply, the insiders are subject to the common interest rate set by the CB, while outsiders have their own national CBs.

Moreover, notice that losses of countries are in general much lower than losses of CBs. Accession of C3 leads to only marginal changes in the case of symmetric shocks. As before, differences between CSs are small under symmetric shocks after accession, suggesting that in the case of symmetric shocks accession has no substantial effects, neither for the accession countries nor for the existing members.

For reasons of brevity we do not report all optimal losses for other cases. These two particular CSs were chosen because of two reasons. Clearly, when an asymmetric price shock hits C3 outcomes are much different from the symmetric shock case. The asymmetry of the shock makes C3 to be less competitive; hence, this economy features by far highest losses and all the other countries are influenced only via spillovers and externalities.

At the same time it increases inflation in C 5 and reduces inflation in the other countries; this pass-through effect therefore will start to mitigate the initial competitiveness effects. In case of the symmetric shock, the effects are rather small. The most striking are the effects of an asymmetric price shock that hits C 3. Before and after the accession losses of this country are very high compared to losses of other players.

Moreover, as pointed out in previous tables, the costs incurred by C 3 at the pre-accession stage is much lower than those at the post-accession stage. It suggests that the study of a symmetric shock is a good starting point but the real issue at stake are asymmetric shocks since their influence is the highest.

Hence, in our model lack of the exchange rate adjustment what also means sharing a common interest rate in an MU is a big burden to the economy hit by an asymmetric shock. These findings are in line with conclusions of the OCA theory. Differences are limited both in the pre- and post accession cases.

The large country C 1 has higher losses than the smaller country C 2 whereas in the symmetric scenario losses were identical. C 3 and C 4 also acquire lower losses than in the benchmark. Note also, that in sc 1 - with the exception of C 3, CB 3, C 5 and CB 5- the exchange rate shock leads to rather similar effects as the asymmetric shock. To get a better insight from the discussion of all scenarios we use some simple statistical methods.

It is interesting to see what are for a particular player the average optimal losses over all CSs. However, now it aggregates possible effects of different coordination regimes. The same holds in the post-accession stage. This result is not far from reality. The adjustment process after a shock is mainly driven by economic spillovers since both monetary and fiscal authorities have only limited influence on economic systems. When a shock occurs they can only partially control economies.

Hence, even an almost complete lack of bargaining power in any coalition is not likely to increase losses substantially as, to a large extent, the economic system returns to balance by itself. This shows that on average all the fiscal players lose from coordination compared to the non-cooperative regime. From this, it could be argued, that if it is completely unclear which CS will be actually played after the coordination process, then all the fiscal players would not enter to any negotiations at all.

They would prefer to play non-cooperatively since the expected loss from coordination is higher. However, this argument does not hold for any other combination of scenarios and shocks, i. The conclusion is that under these conditions players would support the existence of some coordination mechanism as their expected loss from any form of cooperation is lower than from a non-cooperative playing.

To analyze effects of accession we will compute the difference between post- and pre-accession losses for each player, i. Hence, it comes out that on average accession is rather not profitable for the fiscal insiders under asymmetric shocks.

Only in the case of a symmetric shock for sc 1 and sc 3 they both gain on average. In all combinations of scenarios and asymmetric shocks they lose. Moreover, note that these average losses from enlargement are in general much higher than feasible profits. The accession country C 3 gains from entering the MU only in the case of a symmetric shock, however, in all the three scenarios.

The enlargement is on average profitable for all three directly involved fiscal players together only in sc 1 , s 0S and sc 3 , s 0S. Note that by far the highest increase in the average loss is faced by countries of the enlarged MU in the case of an asymmetric price shock. This happens with no exception for all 3 scenarios and certainly calls for further investigation. All the negative numbers tell that there exists a post-accession CS in which the loss for the particular player is lower than the maximum of all losses that this player may incur in the pre-accession CSs.

The result is ambiguous in these cases and requires further investigation. The only conclusion that can be drawn, is the following: for these types of shocks and scenarios we cannot exclude the possibility that gains from enlargement can be found when particular CSs before and after accession are considered. However, in the case of an asymmetric price shock that hits accession country C 3, in all three scenarios, all countries of the enlarged MU, have increased losses in every possible coalition structure.

The enlargement cannot be profitable for any of the fiscal players in the case of an asymmetric price shock. Even, in the presence of a very effective coordination scheme, there is no CS that could assure gains for C 1, C 2 and C 3 after enlargement. This confirms our conclusion, that when there is a high risk of an asymmetric price shock in the accession country, the enlargement is unprofitable.

Moreover, no coordination mechanism can make it profitable. This result obtained here using a framework with an extensive game- theoretic background is in line with results of the basic OCA analysis which lacks any game-theoretic considerations. J MU is positive in 6 cases, and negative in 3 cases.

Moreover, increases of average losses are in general much higher than decreases; hence, we may conclude that the enlargement is rather not profitable also from the point of view of the MU joint welfare. We find that the net effects of accession depend in particular on three factors: i the regime of policy coordination in place before and after accession; ii the type of macroeconomic shock and its degree of symmetry across countries; iii the degree of symmetry between countries in economic structure, sizes of countries and their policy preferences.

The main insights from our analyses can be summarized as follows: i Enlargement is likely to be unprofitable with increasing asymmetries in economic structures and economic shocks. In our setting and in all the examples it emerges that if an asymmetric price shock occurs in the accession country it is never profitable to enlarge the MU.

What is more, the differences in losses between the pre-accession stage and the post-accession stage are so high that it will be difficult to design a transfer system to compensate for a worse situation of some countries. At the end some important limitations of our approach should be mentioned. First, in solving linear-quadratic differential games we assume open-loop information structure, i. Second, we assume a complete lack of uncertainty. Some further issues call for further research.

For instance, different types of shocks could be studied to further strengthen the obtained results. For example, it seems interesting to evaluate the effects of an exchange rate shock that hits the MU as a whole. If such a shock happens, is C 3 better off in the pre-accession stage than in the post-accession stage? If, in such a case, being in an MU is more profitable, the issue of accession will be concerned with a trade-off between the vulnerability to asymmetric price shocks and asymmetric exchange rate shocks.

The earlier enlargements in and in involved only three countries each. The enlargement raised the EU population to about million people from million in the EU countries. ERM II was established in with the resolution of the European Council in order to link the currencies of the EU member states outside the euro area and the euro.

Countries participating in ERM II peg their exchange rates to the euro, allowing for fluctuations within a symmetric band of 15 percent on each side of the central parity. Predecessors of the project are Engwerda et al. In this paper we restrict our attention to profitability of accession. We do not consider stability of different coalition structures or other issues e. For an application of endogenous coalition formation concepts in this setting see Plasmans et al. The dimension of all vectors but i t and e t is n f.

The dimension of the vectors i t and e t is equal to the number of existing central banks n b. This parameterization is based on various empirical studies for the euro area. Angeloni et al. Both small and big countries can be either relatively open or relatively closed. Kimball, Hamza Ali Malik, Malik, Hamza, Amato, Jeffery D. Jeffery D. Ireland, Peter N. Christopher J. Levin, Erceg, Christopher J. Henderson, Kim, Jinill, Monacelli, Tommaso, Tommaso Monacelli, Lawrence J.

Evans, Matthew B. Diba, Pierpaolo Benigno, Benigno, Pierpaolo, Gust, Mussa, Michael, Andrew T. Williams, Hairault, J. Dixit, Avinash K. Rodrigo Caputo, Robert G. Wolman, Louis, issue Nov, pages Louis, vol. Dellas, Harris, Julio Rotemberg, Rotemberg, Julio J, Yun, Tack, Abel, Andrew B.

Rotemberg, Julio J. Julio J. Rotemberg, Calvo, Guillermo A. Fornero, You can help correct errors and omissions. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc. For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Klaus Wohlrabe.

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The similar effect is visible also in losses of CBs and is caused by the asymmetry in the interest rates. Simply, the insiders are subject to the common interest rate set by the CB, while outsiders have their own national CBs. Moreover, notice that losses of countries are in general much lower than losses of CBs. Accession of C3 leads to only marginal changes in the case of symmetric shocks.

As before, differences between CSs are small under symmetric shocks after accession, suggesting that in the case of symmetric shocks accession has no substantial effects, neither for the accession countries nor for the existing members. For reasons of brevity we do not report all optimal losses for other cases. These two particular CSs were chosen because of two reasons.

Clearly, when an asymmetric price shock hits C3 outcomes are much different from the symmetric shock case. The asymmetry of the shock makes C3 to be less competitive; hence, this economy features by far highest losses and all the other countries are influenced only via spillovers and externalities. At the same time it increases inflation in C 5 and reduces inflation in the other countries; this pass-through effect therefore will start to mitigate the initial competitiveness effects.

In case of the symmetric shock, the effects are rather small. The most striking are the effects of an asymmetric price shock that hits C 3. Before and after the accession losses of this country are very high compared to losses of other players. Moreover, as pointed out in previous tables, the costs incurred by C 3 at the pre-accession stage is much lower than those at the post-accession stage.

It suggests that the study of a symmetric shock is a good starting point but the real issue at stake are asymmetric shocks since their influence is the highest. Hence, in our model lack of the exchange rate adjustment what also means sharing a common interest rate in an MU is a big burden to the economy hit by an asymmetric shock.

These findings are in line with conclusions of the OCA theory. Differences are limited both in the pre- and post accession cases. The large country C 1 has higher losses than the smaller country C 2 whereas in the symmetric scenario losses were identical. C 3 and C 4 also acquire lower losses than in the benchmark. Note also, that in sc 1 - with the exception of C 3, CB 3, C 5 and CB 5- the exchange rate shock leads to rather similar effects as the asymmetric shock.

To get a better insight from the discussion of all scenarios we use some simple statistical methods. It is interesting to see what are for a particular player the average optimal losses over all CSs. However, now it aggregates possible effects of different coordination regimes. The same holds in the post-accession stage. This result is not far from reality. The adjustment process after a shock is mainly driven by economic spillovers since both monetary and fiscal authorities have only limited influence on economic systems.

When a shock occurs they can only partially control economies. Hence, even an almost complete lack of bargaining power in any coalition is not likely to increase losses substantially as, to a large extent, the economic system returns to balance by itself. This shows that on average all the fiscal players lose from coordination compared to the non-cooperative regime.

From this, it could be argued, that if it is completely unclear which CS will be actually played after the coordination process, then all the fiscal players would not enter to any negotiations at all. They would prefer to play non-cooperatively since the expected loss from coordination is higher.

However, this argument does not hold for any other combination of scenarios and shocks, i. The conclusion is that under these conditions players would support the existence of some coordination mechanism as their expected loss from any form of cooperation is lower than from a non-cooperative playing. To analyze effects of accession we will compute the difference between post- and pre-accession losses for each player, i. Hence, it comes out that on average accession is rather not profitable for the fiscal insiders under asymmetric shocks.

Only in the case of a symmetric shock for sc 1 and sc 3 they both gain on average. In all combinations of scenarios and asymmetric shocks they lose. Moreover, note that these average losses from enlargement are in general much higher than feasible profits. The accession country C 3 gains from entering the MU only in the case of a symmetric shock, however, in all the three scenarios.

The enlargement is on average profitable for all three directly involved fiscal players together only in sc 1 , s 0S and sc 3 , s 0S. Note that by far the highest increase in the average loss is faced by countries of the enlarged MU in the case of an asymmetric price shock. This happens with no exception for all 3 scenarios and certainly calls for further investigation. All the negative numbers tell that there exists a post-accession CS in which the loss for the particular player is lower than the maximum of all losses that this player may incur in the pre-accession CSs.

The result is ambiguous in these cases and requires further investigation. The only conclusion that can be drawn, is the following: for these types of shocks and scenarios we cannot exclude the possibility that gains from enlargement can be found when particular CSs before and after accession are considered. However, in the case of an asymmetric price shock that hits accession country C 3, in all three scenarios, all countries of the enlarged MU, have increased losses in every possible coalition structure.

The enlargement cannot be profitable for any of the fiscal players in the case of an asymmetric price shock. Even, in the presence of a very effective coordination scheme, there is no CS that could assure gains for C 1, C 2 and C 3 after enlargement. This confirms our conclusion, that when there is a high risk of an asymmetric price shock in the accession country, the enlargement is unprofitable.

Moreover, no coordination mechanism can make it profitable. This result obtained here using a framework with an extensive game- theoretic background is in line with results of the basic OCA analysis which lacks any game-theoretic considerations. J MU is positive in 6 cases, and negative in 3 cases. Moreover, increases of average losses are in general much higher than decreases; hence, we may conclude that the enlargement is rather not profitable also from the point of view of the MU joint welfare.

We find that the net effects of accession depend in particular on three factors: i the regime of policy coordination in place before and after accession; ii the type of macroeconomic shock and its degree of symmetry across countries; iii the degree of symmetry between countries in economic structure, sizes of countries and their policy preferences.

The main insights from our analyses can be summarized as follows: i Enlargement is likely to be unprofitable with increasing asymmetries in economic structures and economic shocks. In our setting and in all the examples it emerges that if an asymmetric price shock occurs in the accession country it is never profitable to enlarge the MU. What is more, the differences in losses between the pre-accession stage and the post-accession stage are so high that it will be difficult to design a transfer system to compensate for a worse situation of some countries.

At the end some important limitations of our approach should be mentioned. First, in solving linear-quadratic differential games we assume open-loop information structure, i. Second, we assume a complete lack of uncertainty. Some further issues call for further research.

For instance, different types of shocks could be studied to further strengthen the obtained results. For example, it seems interesting to evaluate the effects of an exchange rate shock that hits the MU as a whole. If such a shock happens, is C 3 better off in the pre-accession stage than in the post-accession stage?

If, in such a case, being in an MU is more profitable, the issue of accession will be concerned with a trade-off between the vulnerability to asymmetric price shocks and asymmetric exchange rate shocks. The earlier enlargements in and in involved only three countries each. The enlargement raised the EU population to about million people from million in the EU countries.

ERM II was established in with the resolution of the European Council in order to link the currencies of the EU member states outside the euro area and the euro. Countries participating in ERM II peg their exchange rates to the euro, allowing for fluctuations within a symmetric band of 15 percent on each side of the central parity.

Predecessors of the project are Engwerda et al. In this paper we restrict our attention to profitability of accession. We do not consider stability of different coalition structures or other issues e. For an application of endogenous coalition formation concepts in this setting see Plasmans et al. The dimension of all vectors but i t and e t is n f. The dimension of the vectors i t and e t is equal to the number of existing central banks n b.

This parameterization is based on various empirical studies for the euro area. Angeloni et al. Both small and big countries can be either relatively open or relatively closed. A relatively closed but big country may still affect other countries via direct spillover channels more than a relatively open but small country.

They represent the mixed effects of size and openness. To have a clear interpretation we may assume either that countries are of equal size and the value of a spillover parameter indicates openness or that countries differ in size but are equally open. In the latter case the value of a spillover parameter shows relative size of a country.

In this paper we will follow this interpretation. Note the perfect anti-symmetry between preferences of countries and central banks w. See Plasmans et al. Of course, players can block an existence of a coordination mechanism hoping that they will possibly coordinate informally in a subgroup and free ride, when other players will pursue non-cooperative strategies.

The off-diagonal elements of these matrices are the direct spillovers. For Appendix B, see www. Ifo Studien 48 2 — Google Scholar. JEcon 82 1 :1— Angeloni, I. Kashyap, B. Mojon and D. Open econ — Ann Oper Res — Center for Economic Policy Research, London. Open econ. Hooper, P. Johnson and J. Hughes Hallett, A. Frieder, D. Gros, E. Jones eds. Laxton, D. Isard, H. Faruqee, E. Prasad and B. Michalak, T.

Plasmans and J. Engwerda , "Models of endogenous coalition formation between fiscal and monetary authorities in the presence of a monetary union", Working Paper, University of Antwerp, 39 pages. Plasmans, J. Engwerda, B. Smets, F. Download references. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author s and source are credited.

Abel, A. Abel, Taylor, John B, Jung, Yongseung, Tinsley, Clarida, R. Guido Ascari, Ascari, Guido, Kimball, Miles S, Miles S. Kimball, Hamza Ali Malik, Malik, Hamza, Amato, Jeffery D. Jeffery D. Ireland, Peter N. Christopher J. Levin, Erceg, Christopher J. Henderson, Kim, Jinill, Monacelli, Tommaso, Tommaso Monacelli, Lawrence J. Evans, Matthew B. Diba, Pierpaolo Benigno, Benigno, Pierpaolo, Gust, Mussa, Michael, Andrew T.

Williams, Hairault, J. Dixit, Avinash K. Rodrigo Caputo, Robert G. Wolman, Louis, issue Nov, pages Louis, vol. Dellas, Harris, Julio Rotemberg, Rotemberg, Julio J, Yun, Tack, Abel, Andrew B.

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